Back later, major foreign fighter conference about to go off on the beach…

A number of links to sites and stories dealing with jihadis  and ‘foreign fighters’ in Syria.

 “La révolution syrienne menacée par les djihadistes” 14 February 2012, Nora Benkorich, Le Monde

 “Islamists against Assad: Foreign Extremists a Danger to Syria’s Revolution”, 15 February 2012, Ulrike Putz, Speigel

“Sunni Extremists May Be Aiding Al Qaeda’s Ambitions in Syria, Analysts Say”, 15 February 2012, Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, The New York Times

The Jalal Al Muzani forum announcing the death of two Kuwaiti nationals in Syria. This was also mentioned on Twitter by Noman Benotman and Aaron Zelin.

The reporting is a precursor to a complex debate about what role ‘foreign fighters’ will play in Syria, what this means for a social movement that wanted to portray itself as pacific and not connected to terrorist organisations? Historically, most Muslim ‘foreign fighters’ have fought in conflicts where there was a foreign occupier or a context that could fit this type of narrative; Afghanistan I against the Soviets, Bosnia against the Serbs, Chechens against the Russians, Iraq against the Americans and Afghanistan II against American/Western forces. ‘Foreign fighters’ have not typically been present in domestic conflicts between a social movement/insurgency/terrorist entity and a state e.g. Algeria, Egypt, or Libya. A possible exception is the support of the Afghanistan-based ‘foreign fighters’ to the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Will ‘foreign fighters’ be present in large numbers in Syria and will they have an impact on the outcome? These and other questions may require a change in analysis and typologies related to Muslim ‘foreign fighters’.

Thanks to the ever observant Aaron Zelin at Jihadology for the correction on the original posting which carried an irrelevant link.

Students of The Naval Postgraduate School produce research related to terrorism and political violence. A few examples are listed below.  More examples as well as papers and research from other centers can be found at the Homeland Security Digital Library which is a project of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

The Origins and Strategic Objectives of the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Khalifa Hajji, December 2009

Islamist Terrorist Networks Networks Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slaven Blavicki September 2009

Agency and Structure as Determinants of Female Suicide Terrorism: A Comparative Study of Three Conflict Regions, Matthew P. Dearin December 2009

An Assessment of the Global War on Terrorism, 2001-2010, Abdalkhalq Ma’ruf Alftimat, December 2010

An account of a Naval Postgraduate School, August 2010 workshop, “Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators” can be found here.

The International Studies Association (ISA) is holding its annual meeting in San Diego between 1-4 April 2012, with the title “Power, Principles and Participation in the Global Information Age.” 

A copy of the conference programme can be found here. There are numerous workshops and panels related to terrorism and political violence, including some that deal with the theme of foreign fighters. There is an invitation only workshop, “Transnational Actors and Conflict Outcomes”. Participants include David Malet, Colorado State University;  Miriam J. Anderson, Memorial University; Mohammed Hafez, Naval Postgraduate School; Cerwyn Moore, University of Birmingham; Sparsha Saha, Harvard University; and Jennifer Marie Brinkerhoff, George Washington University.

There are two panels that have foreign fighter related papers, “Relationships Among Terrorist Entities: From Conflict to Cooperation” has a paper, “Martyrs Without Borders: Explaining the Phenomenon of Transnational Volunteerism to Foreign Conflicts” (Mohammed Hafez). The second panel, “The Aftermaths of the War on Terror: Renegotiating Gendered National Identities” has a paper, “The Mujahideen in Bosnia: The Foreign Fighter as Cosmopolitan Citizen and/or Terrorist” (Jennifer Mustapha-Vanderkooy).

Later in 2012, the ISA and British International Studies Association (BISA) are holding a joint convention in Edinburgh, Scotland between 20-22 June. This convention, “Diversity in the Discipline: Tension or Opportunity in Responding to Global Challenges”, also has numerous panels on terrorism and political violence, with a panel on foreign fighters. “Foreign Fighters: Assessing the Impact of External Actors on Local Conflicts”. Papers to be presented include:

“A Global View of Foreign Fighter Persistence: Is Islam Really the Answer?” (Adam Quinn and David Malet ),

“Beyond Jihad in Chechnya: Foreign Fighters and the Insurgency in the North Caucasus” (David Malet and Cerwyn Moore),

“Martyrs without Borders: Explaining the Phenomenon of Transnational Volunteerism to Foreign Conflicts” (Mohammed Hafez),

“Transnational Jihad in the Hindu Kush: The Foreign Fighter Experience in Afghanistan, 1979‐2012″ (Brian Glyn Williams).

The conference website is here and the programme is here.

Much discussion of ‘foreign fighters’ tends to focus either on destination zones; Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and to a lesser extent Yemen and the Sahel or the country of origins of those involved in the networks. European, Middle Eastern, and North African nationals and residents are all well documented. On 4 February 2012, The Long War Journal ran a story about the death of an Azerbaijani ‘foreign fighter’. The story was originally carried by the Pakistani newspaper Dawn. This is not the first time Azerbaijani nationals have been reported as operating as ‘foreign fighters’ in Afghanistan. In February 2010, Azerbaijani press carried a report on the arrest of an individual it identified as Saraj (aka Abdul Wahid) who had been detained by the Afghan intelligence service in late December 2009.

In early December 2009, Azerbaijani press had already reported on another Azerbaijani ‘foreign fighter’, Azer Misirkhanov (aka Abdulla aka Abu Omar Azeri). He was reported as having been killed in Afganistan in November 2009. Prior to his death in Afghanistan, Misirkhanov had been arrested in Azerbaijan in 2001 for “illegally crossing the border”. At some point he appears to have been released and became involved in a network planning acts of violence in Azerbaijan.

Investigations in 2008 by the Azerbaijan authorities led to the dismantling of what press named the “Forest group” and which had been involved in planning an attack on the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. The 31 members of the group were tried and testimony suggested that Misirkhanov had previously met others in the group while with an entity named as the “Karabakh partisans” in 2000-2001. Another individual stated he had previously fought in Chechnya against the Russians.

Yet another member of the group, Samir Mehdiyev, was reported to have been involved in an attack on the Abu Bakr mosque on in August 2008. Press stated that he was arrested in January 2010 and extradited from Pakistan in March of the same year. After having fled Azerbaijan, Mehdiyev is alleged to have received support from facilitators in Georgia before traveling on to Pakistan.

In June 2010 the members of the “Forest group” were found guilty and were given sentences ranging from 3 to 15 years.

In August 2010, the Azerbaijani authorities indicated that they had submitted 30 arrest warrants to Interpol for individuals wanted in connection to terrorism. A review of the warrants issued by Azerbaijan for terrorist related activity by Azerbaijani citizens on the Interpol website suggests that some maybe involved in ‘foreign fighter’ networks in Afghanistan given that one of the languages they are listed as speaking is “pashto”.

The above is a mere glance at a topic that merits more attention in relation to the radicalisation processes in Azerbaijan as well as the dynamics of moving from organising violence locally to participation in ‘foreign fighter’ networks in Afghanistan.

At the FRPI foreign fighter conference in 2010, a panel discussed ‘foreign fighters’ in Somalia. The panel made the point that while there was reporting on ‘foreign fighters’ from the Middle East and Europe, there had been less on the role of ‘foreign fighters’ from neighbouring countries like Kenya. They also suggested that defining a ‘foreign fighter’ in the Somali context was complex, is a US-born Somali ‘foreign’? A write-up of the Somalia panel can be found here. Audio and video are here.  A United Nations report from 2011 gives insight into the role on Kenyans and others through their investigations into the bombings in Kampala, Uganda. The United Nations report generated controversy in its detailing of financial ties to Kenya.  A recent article in the Kenyan press profiles a Kenyan ‘foreign fighter’ alleged to hold a leadership position. According to Somalia Report the country continues to be a destination of interest for ‘foreign fighters’. They also have an interview  with the Somali wife of a Sudanese ‘foreign fighter’. The same source has articles or interviews with a former al-Shabaab fighter and a victim of al-Shabaab activities. The killing of an individual with ties to the United Kingdom was widely reported (here and here) and even led to suggestions that  the killing may have been the result of tensions between individuals in al-Shabaab, perhaps about the role or place of ‘foreign fighters’ in the organisation. Obviously much remains to be learnt about ‘foreign fighters’ in Somalia specifically and more generally about how and why individuals become ‘foreign fighters’.

John Horgan has argued for ‘pathways’ and not ‘profiles’, ‘routes’ and not ‘roots’ (Horgan 2008) when asking how individuals come to involve themselves in violence. The key pillars of this approach are that an individual’s movement to involve themselves in terrorism is complex, dynamic, context-specific as opposed to  something explicable by a simple single factor, that is static and  is generalisable.

Complexity is understood to mean that there are no single factor explanations, that multiple factors (for example experience, ideology, social networks) are work at different levels (micro, meso and macro) interacting and producing specific time-space impacts.

Dynamic means that entry into violence activity is not linear or uni-directional but rather an individual can move backwards and forwards in their willingness to engage in violence, further the reaction of others for example the state and its agents to the violence will influence if an individual continues to engage in violence. For example, the arrest and incarceration of a person may temporarily limit access to the terrorist group or network. Horgan argues that the type of role an individual plays can change and is not static. He has suggested that there is movement between roles in an organisation and therefore levels of engagement and perhaps even of belonging to the organisation or group (Horgan 2006, 2008). This assertion is demonstrated in the recent arrest in Mali of four individuals for their involvement in a kidnap for ransom that has been claimed by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Ahmed, 2011, December 14). The article states that the four were arrested for their involvement in the kidnap operation and then gives some basic biographical information about them. It does not seem that these individuals were actively and in an on-going manner associated with one of the two AQIM ‘katiba’ (brigade) in the region. They appear to have taken part in an operation, perhaps in return for payment, perhaps due to kinship or social obligations (Ahmed, 2011, December 14) and then returned to their normal lives. It should also be noted that terrorism studies has yet to conceive of a way to conceptualise levels of involvement beyond simple typologies of ‘member’ or ‘supporter’. How should someone whose involvement is only temporary or punctual be perceived and analysed?

Similar to Rasch’s argument that the left-wing terrorism in West Germany was bound to a time and place that was the late 60s and early 70s in West Germany, context-specific means that what is observed in one country in a period of time is not generalisable to another time and place. Even within a country, different groups with similar ideologies or beliefs may have very different dynamics, for example the members of the North African and Pakistani communities in the United Kingdom who have participated in terrorist activity in the United Kingdom did so for different reasons.

An example of the difference between a profiling and a process approach can be seen in the uses made of data recovered in Sinjar, Iraq concerning among others Moroccan and Libyan nationals. In October 2007, United States military personnel recovered a significant cache of Islamic State of Iraq administrative documents including the biographic data on some 600 foreign nationals who had traveled to fight in Iraq (Fishman, 2007). This data which was analysed and released publicly in a report in late 2007 show the limits of profiling. The origin by country and town was listed, the average age as well as the occupational status 156 of the individuals, and the role they would perform for the ISI. The data suggested that the majority of foreign nationals entering Iraq between 2006 and 2007 were young Saudi males, many of whom were students although per capita there were a significant number of Libyans (Fishman 2007, 7-17). Finally, a majority (56%) of those crossing the border wanted to be a suicide bomber (Fishman 2007, 18). This data and its analysis give little insight into how these individuals came to be fighting in Iraq.

In separate accounts Atran (2007, 2008) and Elliott (2007) examined the same data and then traveled separately to Tetaoun, Morocco to look at how the Moroccans on the Sinjar listing came to be in Iraq. These accounts, one academic and the other an extended newspaper report, come to similar conclusions that group dynamics played an important role in how 5 young men from the same neighbourhood traveled to Iraq through Syria where at least one died in a suicide operation.

Elliott writes of a mixture of personal motives, one individual could not marry his sweet heart, grievances common to the group about the US role in Iraq and the general sense in Tetaoun that fighting in Iraq was justified and legitimate.

Atran (2008, 7-8) writes that all 5 attended the same primary school, 4 were in the same mathematics class in high school, they played football together, prayed at the same Mosque and frequented the same cafe.  One of them was related to one of the Madrid bombers through marriage and they had all attended the same Mosque where one of the Madrid bombers had preached. The 5 were not members of an al-Qa’ida cell, they were not recruited, they became convinced that they should do something about the situation in Iraq and they sought out through their local contacts a way to travel to Iraq. The involvement of the 5 in violent activity appears as a combination of factors; a grievance or perceived injustice that bound the group together, a willingness to do something together, and a sense of adventure. The relative weight of each factor is impossible to determine.

Horgan and Taylor’s (2006, 591) process model can be seen to have more explanatory power in this setting than the descriptive statistics in the Fishman report. Horgan and Taylor suggest that there are ‘setting events’, ‘social/political/organisational context’ and ‘personal factors’. In some senses these are similar to della Porta’s, ‘micro, meso and macro’ levels of analysis commonly used in the Social Movement Theory (della Porta 2009). An example of a ‘personal factor’ was one of the individuals was unable to marry his sweetheart but instead married by his family to the sister of his brother’s wife. A ‘setting event’ was that some of the Madrid bombers were also from Tetaoun and linked through marriage to one member of the group. The bombing and the subsequent police investigations in Tetaoun appear to have set members of the group looking at the legitimacy of the Madrid attacks. The ‘social/organisational/context’ is the general sense in Tetaoun that the United States presence in Iraq was illegitimate and that fighting against them was legitimate (social context). The group also seems to have benefited from the ability of someone in Tetaoun to help them connect to al-Qaeda (organizational context).

Bartlett and Miller (2012, 13-14) in examining who engages in violence and who does not have identified four potential areas that may differentiate the ‘violent radicals’ from the ‘radicals’. They suggest that ‘emotional pull’, ‘thrill, excitement, coolness’, ‘status and internal code of honour’ and finally ‘peer pressure’ may all contribute to the turn to violence. In the case of the group from Tetaoun these factors can be seen in Atran’s and Elliotts’ accounts. Elliott writes that a 6th individual close to the group did not go to Iraq but told her that if he had been asked it would have been difficult to say no.

Similar to the Atran and Elliot accounts of Tetouan in Morocco, Peraino (2008) traveled to Darnah in Libya to undertake to try and understand why nearly half of the Libyan foreign fighters – 52 out of 112 -  had come from one town. He initially speculates about a combination of factors; joblessness, a local environment where resistance was venerated, and the Abu-Gharib scandal. He concludes somewhat simplistically by writing that the answer to why these individuals traveled to Iraq to fight was “an explosive mix of desperation, pride and religious fervour” before then stating that, “these factors, present individually in many parts of the Islamic world, are found collectively here, on the shores of northern Libya” (Peraino, 2008). Peraino’s account lacks the nuance and rigour of those of Atran and Elliott, he seems to be looking for an overarching explanation when in all probability there are 52 different explanations.  Ironically, the article’s most insightful comment is a quote from Fishman, author of the initial Sinjar report, who states, “The dynamics are very, very, local”.

The Atran and Elliot accounts when compared to the Fishman analysis and the Peraino’s report reinforce the notion that ‘thick’ description and on-the-ground data-collection will always generate insight and eventually conclusions about why people may choose violence as opposed to thin secondary analysis or searches for a single explanation. These ‘thick’ accounts also reinforce the complexity and dynamic nature of pathways into and through terrorist activity, indicating that there is no one simple explanation.

Sources:

Ahmed, B. (2011, December 14). “Mali : comment les auteurs présumés du rapt de Verdon et Lazarevic ont été arêtes.” Jeune Afrique.

Atran, S. (2006). “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism”. The Washington Quarterly 29(2): 127-147.

Atran, S. (2007). “Terrorism and Radicalization: What Not to Do, What to Do.” Briefing for U.S. State Dept and House of Lords: 1–50.

Bartlett, J. & Miller, C. (2012). “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization.” Terrorism and Political Violence 24(1): 1–21. Or the longer Demos report here

Elliott, A. (2007, November 25). “Where Boys Grow Up to Be Jihadis.” The New York Times. 

Fishman, B. (2007). “Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records.” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences US Military Academy West Point, New York.

Horgan, J. (2003). “The Search for the Terrorist Personality” in Silke, A. (ed) Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences. Wiley: Chichester. pp.3-25

Horgan, J. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism. Routledge: London and New York

Horgan, J. (2008). “From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618(1): 80–94.

Horgan, J. (2009). Walking Away from Terrorism. Routledge: London and New York.

Peraino, K. (2008, April 19). “Destination Martyrdom.” Newsweek. 

Porta, della, D. (2009). “Social Movement Studies And Political Violence.” Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation.

Rasch, W. (1979). “Psychological dimensions of political terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany.” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 2(1): 79–85.

Taylor, M., & Horgan, J. (2006). “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18(4): 585–601.

Almost two years ago CSIS ran a conference entitled, “The Dynamics of North African Terror”, which examined terrorism and political violence in the region.  The conference conclusions suggested  a comprehensive strategy was necessary. A report can be found here and audio of the conference is here.

In a similar vein, a National Defense University report from July 2011 sought to give an assessment of primarily US options in the Sahel to mitigate against AQIM activities. It argues for a more robust response, over and above existing initiatives (Le Sage, 2011).

Reports over the past couple of days generated by meetings in Morocco and Mauritania again examine the Sahel region and its various security challenges (AFP 2012, Reuters 2012). The articles have concentrated on “a connection” between AQIM and Boko Haram, and strategies to combat the groups. The articles, particularly the Reuters one hint at the complexity of finding solutions given the varying interests and agendas of those concerned – directly and indirectly – by the security issues.

An outcome of the Mauritania meeting, was Mali’s Foreign Minister stating, “We will … conduct joint patrols along our borders, prosecute criminals, control travel documents” (AFP, 2012).  It is unlikely that this will be enough to deal with AQIM activities.

All of this seems to be someway from a comprehensive strategy advocated nearly 2 years ago. If terrorism studies research and more than a decade of investigating and interdicting terrorist entities has demonstrated anything, it is that local knowledge and context is important. In the Sahel there is precious little of the type of research that has been conducted in Europe or North America by scholars like Atran, Horgan, Sageman and Silke.

On a slightly tangential but nonetheless AQIM note, various “tweeters” using #aqim have noted that the Algerian authorities announced the disruption of an AQIM plot against shipping in the Mediterranean (Echourouk 2012, ABC, 2012). The reports are somewhat light on details, although the article notes that a boat had been purchased. An interesting question, not asked, is how does a relatively rural insurgency go from roadside bombings and roadblocks to planning and executing an attack against shipping?  A significant problem of much reporting and analysis on terrorism is its use of threat paradigms without defining how to assess threat (capacity, knowledge, intent etc). So while the intent or more likely aspiration may have been present; surfing the internet is somewhat different to sailing the high seas in an explosive-laden boat.

Finally, Cridem carries an interview with the representative of the remaining “Salafist” prisoners in Mauritania, Mohamed El Béchir Kharachi Sall. The interview mentions the now two year old dialogue initiated by the Mauritanian authorities to “deradicalise” Mauritanian militants with links to AQIM. Sall uses the interview to deny connections to AQIM and to remind the government that there are still individuals in detention who remain willing to dialogue.

Sources:

“Dossier des salafistes en détention – Interview“, Cheikh Tidiane Dia, Le Rénovateur Quotidien (Mauritanie)

“The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb“, Andre Le Sage, Strategic Forum, National Defense University, July 2011

“Algeria foils Al Qaeda terrorist plot to attack foreign ships sailing in the Mediterranean“, Echorouk, 24 January 2012

“Al Qaeda Affiliate Targets US Ships: Report“, ABC, Lee Ferran and Pierre Thomas, 24 January 2012

ANALYSIS-Africa’s Sahel scrambles to avert slide “into hell”, William Maclean, Reuters, 23 January 2012,

“West African states to work together against terror“, AFP, 24 January 2012.

Cridem has a report here on the leader of the new AQIM splinter group, “The Unity and Jihad Group in West Africa”. It profiles Hamada Ould Mohamed El Khaîry (Khairou), an alleged leader and his activities over the years from burka-wearing escapee, explosive-handling arrestee to sun-glass toting leader.

Another piece has more on the developments concerning the individuals arrested in November 2011, of particular interest are the comments on Mohamed Salem Ould Mohamed Lemine (al-Majilissi).

As has been noted elsewhere Liberation carried a report derived from its access to a French judicial report based on an interview with a Mauritanian militant present during the attempt to rescue two French nationals kidnapped in Niamey, Niger which ended in both being killed. The articles are now available here and here.

They also have a report in todays paper about Adelene Hicheur, an academic arrested and currently in pre-trial detention. The article contains details on the correspondence between Hicheur and the AQIM member. Of interest are the comments by Hicheur about activity in the real world and activity on the web.

“Adlène Hicheur ne cesse de le marteler depuis plus de deux ans : protégé par l’anonymat de la Toile, ne sachant pas précisément à qui il s’adressait, il s’est laissé griser et embarquer dans des propos dépassant sa pensée. Evoquant le caractère «fantaisiste» de certaines de ses adresses sur des forums islamistes, Adlène Hicheur a expliqué: «Cela veut dire que c’est une adresse du monde web détachée de ma vie […]. Je fais la différence entre les personnes physiques que je connais et qui appartiennent à mon cercle de vie et les pseudos qui appartiennent à une réalité déconnectée. C’est vraiment du virtuel.»”  (Liberation, 2012, January 10).

Given that the Hicheur investigation is the last time that an AQIM associated plot, if it can really be called that, was disrupted in Europe, the article is revealing. If the raids and arrests of the 1990s and early 2000s (1998 World Cup, Strasbourg, Chechen network etc) are compared with recent investigations there is a difference in size and capacity of the networks. Perhaps those inspired into activism by the FIS or GIA or their Afghanistan connections have to some extent found other things to do and AQIM’s messaging into Europe does not seem to be attracting comparable levels of activism and interest?

According to Liberation, the Hicheur case will go to trial in the next 3 months.

Tassel, F. (2012, January 10). “Grand Angle: Psuedo jihadiste”. Liberation

As the year begins and the temptation to predict is upon journalists and others, it is judicious to reflect on what we do not know and what may blur clear thinking and prescient analysis. Duyvesteyn has stated that, ‘We know little about the history of terrorism, and what we think we know is not really the subject of debate’ (Duyvesteyn 2007:52). Tony Judt in “Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century” echoes this when he writes about ‘The danger of abstracting “terrorism” from its different contexts, setting it upon a pedestal as the greatest threat to Western civilization, or democracy, or “our way of life” and targeting it for an indefinite war is that we neglect the many challenges of the age. On this, too, the illusions and errors of the cold war years might have something to teach us about ideological tunnel vision. Hannah Arendt, once again: “The greatest danger of recognizing totalitarianism as the curse of the century would be an obsession with it to the extent of becoming blind to the numerous small and not so small evils with which the road to hell is paved.” But of all our contemporary illusions, the most dangerous is the one that underpins and accounts for all the others. And that is the idea that we live in a time without precedent: that what is happening to us is new and irreversible and that the past has nothing to teach us…except when it comes to ransacking it for serviceable precedents’ (Judt 2008:19).

Asides from the admonition to learn from the past rather than to pay it scant attention, Judt also alludes to the fact that terrorism is complex, that there is no simple explanation; madness or sheer evil will not do. There is more than either of these to why violence occurs. On this subject Hayden has written a thought provoking article, “The complexity of terrorism: social and behavioral understanding – trends for the future”. It is available in the Ranstrop edited “Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction” and an earlier version is available here.

Will 2012 be, a year of learning from history (or should that be learning history) and recognizing complexity?

Judt, T. (2008). “Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century”. Penguin: London

Duyvesteyn, I. (2007). ‘The Role of History and Continuity in Terrorism Research’ in Ranstorp, M. (ed). “Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction.” Routledge: Oxford. pp.51-75

Hayden, N.K. (2007). ‘The complexity of terrorism: social and behavioral understanding – trends for the future’ in Ranstorp, M. (ed). “Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction.” Routledge: Oxford. pp.292-315.